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DISORGANIZATION OF METROPOLITAN LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND SOME PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
(The Illinois Cook County Situation)
Recent investigations by the Kefauver Committee revealed an alarming
failure on the part of metropolitan law enforcement agencies to enforce the
law. The Committee asserted that this failure was partially due to the
organization of law enforcement in metropolitan regions where there usually
are "large numbers of city, town, and village police forces which work
together or refuse to cooperate as they please." 1
Defects in the law enforcement structure of a representative metropolitan
area-Cook County, Illinois, which includes the City of Chicago-have been
examined and an analysis has been made of the solutions which may be
used in solving the existing problems of such metropolitan communities. The
first section of this paper is devoted to setting forth some major defects
present in the law enforcement structure of Cook County. The second section
deals with a presentation and analysis of several solutions that have been
proposed to improve law enforcement in metropolitan areas and the applica-
tion of these solutions.
I
Within the boundaries of Cook County, there are 954 square miles,
4,508,792 people and over 90 incorporated cities or villages.2 Approximately
8,100 law enforcement officers, employed by over 90 law enforcement agencies,
operate in this county. The greatest number of policemen perform their
functions in the city of Chicago where there is the highest population con-
centration. Two of the largest forces in Cook County, the Chicago police force
with 6,244 men and the Chicago park police force with 782, operate solely
within the city limits of Chicago.3 These two forces employ 86% of the
policemen and protect 80% of the population. The remaining forces, with
14% of the policemen, are entrusted with protecting 20% of the population
and the majority of the area of Cook County.
The ninety police forces of Cook County operate within fixed jurisdictions,
differing greatly in area, and with few exceptions4 they do little or no en-
1. SEN. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1951).
2. Population figures for Chicago and Cook County were obtained from DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, 1950 CENSUS OF POPULATION, Series PC-S, No. 12 (1951).
3. These figures were obtained from CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT ANN. REP. 12 (1950)
and CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT ANN. REP. 71 (1950). The figure for the park police does
not include 8 policewomen and 80 service guards.
4. Several police forces in the suburbs north of Chicago share the same police radio
frequency and may pick up each other suburb's radio calls. An interview with a police
chief in one of these suburbs on November 16, 1951, disclosed that police in one of these
suburbs will enter an adjoining suburb either voluntarily or on request in answer to
radio calls.
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forcement work outside their own areas. The sheriff, as defined by Illinois
statutes,5 is the chief law enforcement officer of the county and has power
to enforce the law anywhere within the limits of the county. This jurisdic-
tion, in geographical extent, is surpassed only by the State Highway Patrol,
which has power to enforce the law anywhere within the State of Illinois.6
In practice the Sheriff of Cook County does not exercise this overriding
jurisdiction but confines his work to the unincorporated areas.7 The ninety
police forces in Cook County operate for the most part without coordination of
efforts and equipment, and many times without knowledge of what other
forces in the county are doing or attempting to do. The combined strength
of law enforcement in Cook County is so weakened by the discoordinated
structure that the process of law enforcement is seriously impeded.
The major defects in the structure of the combined law enforcement agencies
are treated under three main divisions: (1) the duplication of efforts and
overlapping of jurisdiction, (2) the lack of coordination in the administration
of police activities and its effect on law enforcement and (3) the in-
adequacies within individual forces which affect the total organization.
Duplications and Overlappings: The presence of ninety police forces
within one county in itself indicates the probability of duplication of efforts
in law enforcement. The most obvious duplication exists within Chicago
where two independent police forces are operating simultaneously to enforce
the law. The Chicago police operate anywhere within the city limits except
for the park district areas, while the Park Police operate primarily in the
parks and on the boulevards.8 The Park Police are concerned mainly with
traffic control as evidenced by the fact that four-fifths of the force is made
up of traffic policemen. They exercise jurisdiction up to the property line
on all park boulevards and within the boundaries of all parks in Chicago.
There are over 136 parks and more than 60 streets and boulevards under
this jurisdiction, some of the streets extending the full width of Chicago
while others are spread over the entire length of the city.9 Although the
combined area of all the parks and streets protected by the park police is
only a fraction of that protected by the city police, the geographical loca-
tions of these areas requires the park police to spread their forces over the
entire city. This is, in effect, one police force superimposed upon another.
5. ILL. REV. STAT. C. 125, §17 (1951).
6. ILL. REV. STAT. C. 121, §307.16 (1951). This statute appears to grant general law
enforcement to the state police. The Illinois Supreme Court has not as yet passed on this
statute, however, and some police officials have doubts as to whether the grant is as broad
as assummed here.
7. Mr. Michael Walsh, Sheriff of Cook County 1946 to 1950, stated before the Kefauver
committee, "My jurisdiction is Cook County. The sheriff here is still the highest law-
enforcement officer in the county. However, the sheriff does not exercise jurisdiction in
the municipalities, particularly in Chicago. . . . So the sheriff confines himself, so far as
police work is concerned, to the unincorporated areas in Cook County." Hearings before
Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce on S.R. 202,
81st Cong., 2d Sess., Part 5, 175 (1950). During an interview with personnel in the office
of the Sheriff's Chief of Police on November 30, 1951, it was stated that this plan for
supervision in unincorporated areas is still in effect.
8. Chicago city police power is provided for under MUNICIPAL CODE OF CHICAGO C. 11-24
(1950). Park police power is granted under ILL. REV. STAT. c. 105, §330a (1951). Al-
though the statute conferring police powers on park policemen does not limit the use of
these powers to park areas, an interview with a park police lieutenant on November 14,
1951, disclosed that the park police assume jurisdiction only in the parks and on boulevards
under park authority.
9. Facts were obtained during an interview at park police headquarters on November




The dual police system in Chicago gives rise to many types of efforts. A
call for police aid from a motorist involved in an accident on a park boulevard
will often result in the dispatch of two squad cars to the scene, one from
the city police and one from the park police.10 , Any major crime committed
within park jurisdiction is investigated by both the park and the city police
and park police traffic tickets must be given special handling by the clerk of
the court in processing the fine paid by a motorist. Mlaintaining two separate
and independent police forces within the city limits of Chicago requires two
distinct organizations, with the necessary duplications of chiefs of police, ad-
ministrative staffs, complaint rooms, radio broadcasting units, and independent
clerical staffs and records sections.1 '
The participation of two or more forces in a single function of police work
which could be adequately handled by one force is also a problem present in
the area of Cook County outside of Chicago. The routine process of patrolling
a highway within the limits of the county often involves two and at times
three agencies; these agencies being the state police, the Sheriff's highway
police, and a local police department. The Sheriff and the state police have
no specific method or plan of dividing the patrol work and not infrequently
both operate a few miles apart.'2 This intensive patrolling of the highways
would be commendable if enough men were available to provide such protec-
tion to motorists. However, the Sheriff is at the present time insisting that he
is badly understaffed and the state police do not have adequate forces to
handle all of their problems.' 3 An accident on a highway in Cook County
could and has brought three different squad cars to the scene; one state police
squad, a squad from the Sheriff's office, and one from a local police force.'
4
Thus, two police cars are not available to perform other duties while the acci-
dent is being investigated and reports are being filled out by all three squads.
The Sheriff of Cook County has, in practice, assumed jurisdiction over the
unincorporated sections of the county. A portion of his time is spent, how-
ever, in enforcing the law, particularly laws pertaining to gambling and
vice, in incorporated areas where local officials have failed to do so. A former
Sheriff of Cook County estimated that fifty percent of the gambling raids made
during his tenure in office were conducted within municipalities that main-
10. A normal call for police assistance would be made to the city police number, which
is conveniently listed inside the front cover of the Chicago telephone directory. The city
police dispatch squad cars by radio. The park police monitor these radio calls and send
a squad car when the call involves park territory. Thus, the disptach of a Chicago squad
car would be followed shortly by the dispatch of a park police car.
11. Stated in an interview at the park police administration building on November 14,
1951. The park police headquarters are in the administration building for the park district
in Burnham Park while the city police maintain their headquarters at 1121 South State
Street. The city police commissioner has his office in City Hall, 121 North LaSalle Street.
12. Interview with personnel at the office of the Sheriff's Chief of Police on November
30, 1951.
13. In 1950 before the Kefauver Committee Sheriff Michael Walsh stated, "Each year
before the budget is passed upon, I have requested an additional 100 police officers which
I can put on investigative work and help the general work. I have been turned down every
year that I have gone in." Hearings, supra note 7, at 176. For current demands for more
men see Chicago Daily News, November 15, 1951, p. 15, col. 1; November 19, 1951, p.
16, col. 1.
Governor Adlai E. Stevenson has stated that "The State Police of Illinois are under-
manned as it is for their normal duties of highway patrol." See News Release from the
Office of the Governor, Springfield, for Release in Morning Newspapers of Wednesday,
October 24, 1951.
14. One such incident recently occurred on a highway running through the village of
Skokie. Facts were stated during an interview at the Sheriff's highway police head-
quarters on November 30, 1951.
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tained their own police forces.' 5 This failure by local officials to enforce gam-
bling laws results in the Sheriff's police doing the work that the local police
organization could and should do. Flagrant lack of cooperation of this type
by local officials has been attacked by the State's Attorney for Cook County.
On two separate occasions the State's Attorney secured indictments from grand
juries charging nonfeasance in office by two chiefs of police in Cook County
but in both cases the officials were found not guilty in the ensuing trials before
local juries.' 6
Some communities in Cook County rely upon the Sheriff's police for pro-
tection during at least a part of the twenty-four hours each day. A number
of the communities in this group are too small to support a full time police
department while others in this class prefer to pass the burden of protection
to the Sheriff. Some of the communities in the county employ policemen for
traffic control only and are completely dependent upon the Sheriff for the
apprehension of any criminal.' 7 The Sheriff's police are saddled with this
extra burden and expense of providing protection for these communities and
must either duplicate the work done by a small untrained department or
handle the entire function of criminal investigation and apprehension alone.
The State's Attorney in Illinois has as a primary function the prosecution
of all persons who have violated the laws of the state.18 In order to aid in the
investigation of crime the Chicago Police Commissioner customarily assigns
approximately seventy city policemen to the State's Attorney's office in Cook
County as investigative agents.19 This force is generally used as an investi-
gating agency. However, the State's Attorney has used this force to make
gambling raids in the rural areas of the county not only to gather evidence
but also to enforce gambling laws in those places where the State's Attorney
claims that the Sheriff has failed to do so. 20 As a result two organizations
15. Interview with Mr. Elmer Michael Walsh, Sheriff of Cook County from 1946 to
1950, on November 2, 1951.
16. The Chiefs of Police of Calumet City and Melrose Park were indicted by a grand
jury for nonfeasance in office. See Hearings, supra, note 7,, at 259.
17. Ninety-two incorporated areas in Cook County not including Chicago maintained
police departments in strengths as follows:
Range in Population of the
No. of No. of Communities
Men Communities Lowest Highest
0 9 232 2,129
1-2 23 788 8,138
3-5 22 854 10,531
6-10 13 361 8,899
11'-20 17 4,839 20,683
21-30 4 10,823 27,473
over 30 4 51,280 73,641
This table was computed from statistics made available by Chief Tuohy of the Sheriffs
Police. The population data was secured from DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 1950 CENSUS OF
POPULATION, Series PC-8, No. 12 (1951).
18. ILL. REV. STAT. C. 14 §5 (1951).
19. State's Attorney William Boyle of Cook County stated before the Kefauver Com-
mittee, "We have assigned to our office about 76 police officers of the city of Chicago to
do investigative work." Hearings, supra note 7, at 153. In an interview at the office of
the Chicago police commissioner on November 7, 1951, it was stated that it is customary
to assign officers as over 90% of the crimes prosecuted in Cook County originate in Chicago
and Chicago should bear the cost of investigating these crimes.
20. State's Attorney Boyle, Hearings, supra note 7, at 154, "In addition to the duties of
trying these criminal cases which come into our office, we started November 1, 1949, on
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are being expended on a single effort, that of enforcing gambling laws, when
one organization, the Sheriiff's police, should be sufficient.
The Coroner under the Illinois statutes serves not only in his normal capacity
but he also serves as an auxiliary sheriff, retaining all the powers the Sheriff
possesses.2 ' This duplication is to guarantee that there will be some officer in
the county to act as Sheriff in the event the incumbent Sheriff becomes
incapacitated.
The decentralized organization of law enforcement in Cook County is the
primary cause for many costly duplications and overlappings. Honest and
sincere efforts to eliminate duplications in order to guarantee adequate law
enforcement are often frustrated because of the wide diversification of con-
trol and responsibility and the superimposing of one force upon another.
Lack of Administrative Coordination: Duplication of functions results not
only from the overlapping jurisdictions of numerous police organizations but
also from the lack of adequate coordination of the activities of the various
police agencies. Unfortunately, efforts made toward attaining coordination
are often negated by the wide diversification of control and responsibility that
exists in the overall law enforcement structure of the county.
One important element in obtaining adequate coordination of the many
forces is complete integration of information. Unless information pertinent
to a particular problem reaches the force or forces that can act upon the
problem, it will remain unsolved or uncorrected. Progress has been made in
developing radio communication between forces in the event of emergen-
cies2 2 but this progress has not been carried over to the exchange of routine
information. Cordial relations between police departments are relied upon
heavily in receiviing or transmitting routine information rather than a set
procedure of free exchange in all matters that may be of value, such as data
on organized crime.
The Chicago city police have no permanent arrangement for exchange of
reports and material with the state police but rely upon the continued cordial
relations with the head of the state police in Chicago.28 The absence of friendly
relations between organizations under such a system could result in a break-
down in the exchange of material necessary to the adequate functioning of the
two offices. This is illustrated by the recent relationships between the Sheriff
and State's Attorney. Both were working on one case at the same time and
each was obtaining information which could have been of use to the other.
Until public pressure was brought to bear on both officials they declined to
compare and consolidate their respective findings.24
our own, to go out and make raids on places that had slot machines. Since November of
1949 we have confiscated and destroyed 564 slot machines."
Query: "Would that be a duty that you would take on because other law enforcement
agencies failed to do it?"
Boyle: "Yes."
Query: "What agencies have the final responsibility?"
Boyle: "The sheriff of Cook County is supposed to do that. It wasn't being done and
we knew there were slot machines out in the county."
21. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 31, §§6, 9 and 10 (1951).
22. Interview with the Sheriff's Chief of Police and a suburban Chief of Police.
23. Stated during an interview at the office of the Police Commissioner of the Chicago
police department on November 7, 1951.
24. In an interview at the Chicago Crime Commission on November 12, 1951, it was
pointed out that the State's Attorney and the Sheriff of Cook County were conducting sep-
arate investigations of a beating given a prominent anti-gambling crusader but were not
consolidating their respective findings. Pressure from newspapers demanding appre-
19521
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The absence of adequate reporting procedure in processing the recovery of
stolen automobiles is another example of a failure in communications between
the suburban police forces and the Chicago city police. Until recently the
recovery by some suburban police of automobiles stolen in Chicago would not
be reported to the Chicago police and the automobiles would remain listed as*
stolen in the Chicago records.25 The possibility of delay and inconvenience'to
the rightful owner, who might be apprehended and questioned by the Chicago
police when driving his own car, is self evident.
Under an Illinois statute the police in any one municipality are empowered
to enter an adjoining municipality in the same county to preserve the peace
in certain situations. 26 This statute is not utilized by many police forces in
Cook County and was not used when the possibility for such use arose in a
recent incident, the Cicero riot.27 During this riot it became necessary for
the Sheriff of Cook County to request assistance from the Illinois National
Guard. If the Sheriff could have used the police manpower available in the
county during the initial stages of the riot, it possibly could have been avoided.
The Police Commissioner of Chicago stated that the Chicago policemen are not
protected by their annuity and disability benefits if injured or killed outside
the city limits. 28 This interpretation of the Police Annuity and Pension Fund
Act-which, incidentally, is susceptible to a different interpretation-pre-
vented the Chicago city police from being available for service during the
riot and deprived the Sheriff of the largest potential source of manpower.2 9
This provision also tends to deter any plan for the integration of policemen
from the various organizations for use throughout the county.
Any effective coordination of efforts must arise from the voluntary cooper-
ation of all the forces involved and must be planned in advance. As will be
discussed subsequently, there are plans for such coordination and these plans
have proved to be highly effective. As in other areas of coordination in the
county, however, these plans are the exception rather than the rule. There
are no regular meetings of the heads of the various agencies so that further
plans may be worked out and the various problems of the forces discussed.
hension of the assailants resulted in a pooling of information and efforts by both agencies.
An example of this later pooling is the joint squad of State's Attorney's and Sheriff's
police that made a trip to the resort section of Wisconsin in search of the assailants'
hideout. See Chicago Sun-Times, November 15, 1951, p. 10, col. 1.
25. From an interview at the office of the Sheriff's Chief of Police on November 30, 1951.
26. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 24, §§8-9, 8-10 (1951).
27. During the week ending July 14, 1951, riots on three successive nights in Cicero,
Illinois became so violent that Sheriff John Babb of Cook County requested assistance
from the Illinois National Guard. Previous to the arrival of the Guard the only police
present were the Cicero police force of 82 men and the Sheriff's police.
28. Interview with Police Commissioner O'Connor on November 7, 1951.
29. ILL. REv. STAT. c. 24-, §§956, 977, 989 (1951). These sections cover the meaning of
"act of duty," provide for relief in the form of an annuity to the widow of a policeman
killed while performing an act of duty, and provide disability benefits to policemen in-
jured while performing an act of duty. An "act of duty" is defined under the statute as
". .. those acts involving special risks as imposed by Illinois statutes or ordinances or
police regulations of the city under this statute." The Illinois Supreme Court, in People v.
Retirement Board Policemen's A. and B. Fund, 326 Ill. 579, 158 N.E. 220 (1927), defined
the act of duty as "... an injury occurring in the course of and arising out of the work
of a policemen."
There may be doubt as to whether a policeman may perform an act of duty outside of
the area in which he is empowered to act. However, under Illinois statutes a policeman
may be ordered to enter adjoining municipalities to suppress riots and perform other
certain duties. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 24, §§8-9, 8-10 (1951). It would seem that a policeman
would be covered by his benefit and annuity rights when acting under orders in com-
pliance with this statute.
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The decentralized structure of law enforcement in the county, 'with its wide
diversification of control and responsibility, is the basic reason for many of
the failures in proper coordination of efforts. The emphasis on local autonomy
that exists in the present structure is secured at the cost of effective county
wide coordination of police efforts.
Inadequacies within the Individua Forces: Certain inadequacies present
within individual forces inherently weaken the effectiveness of the county wide
police structure.
One of the most pressing deficiencies is that of manpower. The Police Com-
missioner of the Chicago police stated that in his opinion Chicago needs another
one thousand men in order to obtain optimum law enforcement. 3° The Sheriff
of Cook County has requested another one hundred law enforcement officers,
nearly enough to double his present force.3 1 The smaller police departments
are not so pressed for available manpower, but if the forces which do not
employ enough men for twenty-four hour protection were expanded, it would
relieve the Sheriff of the burden of supplying at least part-time protection
in such communities.
The Sheriff has available for actual law enforcement work about twenty-four
men" for each of three shifts during a twenty-four hour period. 32 These men
must be divided among the three districts in the county so that there are only
eight men available for police duty in any one district at any one time. The
Sheriff has few reserves and must utilize his men as best he can. On rare
occasions the Sheriff has deputized process servers and others on his staff in
order to muster a strong force for a particular raid33 but this source of man-
power cannot be relied upon for sustained law enforcement activities. The
deputies secured under this method are untrained and unfamiliar with the
work of a police officer and are available only after they have finished a day's
work in the position for which they were employed. The Sheriff, under Illinois
statutes, has the power of deputizing any citizen in the county.34 However, in
practice this power is limited to the policemen in other forces who are trained
in law enforcement work. The Sheriff is further limited in deputizing police in
other forces as these officers are needed by the communities that employ them
and are available as deputy sheriffs only in cases of emergency.
The Chicago Police Force, in certain districts, does not have sufficient police-
men available to provide optimum protection.3 5 The Fifth Police District,
for six years, had the highest rate of all Chicago police districts in the crimes
of homicide, rape and robbery and was first or second in total of all major
offenses. 36 In 1946 the Chicago Crime Commission pointed out that "Law
30. Interview with Police Commissioner O'Connor on November 7, 1951.
31. See note 20 supra.
32. This figure is based on information secured during an interview at the office of the
Sheriff's Chief of Police. At this interview it was stated that from 6 to 8 men are
available for each shift in each of the three districts. It is interesting to compare this
figure with that given before the Kefauver Committee by the then Sheriff, Michael Walsh,
who stated that he had 129 law enforcement officials available. Hearings, srupra, note
7, at 175.
33. Such a force was mustered during the tenure of Elmer Michael Walsh, 1946 to
1950, in order to make a large raid on Calumet City. The raid was successful, but Mr.
Walsh stated during an interview on November 2, 1951, that the source of manpower-is
not satisfactory.
34. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 38, §525 (1951).
35. The Chicago police department provides one policeman for every 580 persons in
Chicago. This computation is based upon the 1950 census figures. DEPARTMENT OF COM-
MERCE, 1950 CENSUS OF POPULATION, Series PC-8, No. 12 (1951).




enforcement conditions in the Fifth Police District are totally unsatisfactory
. . . police protection is inadequate."13" In 1949, after two murders that
aroused public opinion, additional men were assigned to the district.3 8 Thus,
with the city police force at its present strength, Chicago does not have police-
men that could be made available to other forces in the county even if the
benefit and insurance provisions were amended so that these policemen could
be sent outside the city.
The Sheriff is customarily a person inexperienced in law enforcement work
and not primarily interested in making such work his career. The Illinois
Constitution provides that the Sheriff may not succeed himself in office. 39
Every four years a new man, customarily unfamiliar with police work, must
replace a man who has just acquired enough experience and knowledge to
become a potentially strong force against crime. The provision that the Sheriff
may not succeed himself discourages any career policemen from running for
the office and thus eliminates the type of person most desirable as Sheriff.
The Sheriff's police do not come within the civil service laws and each new
Sheriff appoints new deputies on taking office. Every four years Cook County
has a new, inexperienced Sheriff and a nearly complete turnover in the Sher-
iff's police force.
The Sheriff's police force is reasonably well equipped for its present staff
but the Chicago police force is in need of some essential items of equipment,
such as squad cars and two-way radios. The park police and smaller forces
throughout the county have adequate equipment and appear to be able to
function effectively with what they have.
40
Some of the inadequacies in the various police departments could be elimi-
nated if Cook County had a county law enforcement structure that would
permit and encourage pooling of manpower and equipment. In order to make
this pooling most effective the Chicago police must be made available for use
throughout the county. The present county wide structure of police forces
has the opposite effect of making each force dependent upon itself without
recourse normally to other police agencies.
II
ANALYSIS OF PossrBLE SOLUTIONS
Numerous solutions have been proposed to help solve the problems inherent
in the structural organization of law enforcement in metropolitan areas similar
to Cook County. These reforms fall roughly into three categories: (1) super-
vision and centralization of responsibility at the state level, (2) voluntary
coordination at the local level without change in the existing organization of
law enforcement and (3) reorganization through consolidation and centrali-
zation of authority on the local level. In analysing each reform, care must be
taken to determine whether the reorganization or change advocated would fit
the actual conditions of Cook County. In making this determination the
underlying social and political factors involved must be considered, as well
as the problems peculiar to law enforcement.
37. CRIMINAL JUSTICE No. 73, CRIME CONDITIONS IN FIFTH POLICE DISTRICT 19 (1946).
38. CRIMINAL JUSTICE No. 77, AN EXAMINATION OF CHICAGO'S LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES 5 (1950).
39. ILL CONST. Art. X, §8.
40. As estimated in interviews at the Chicago Crime Commission, office of the Police
Commissioner of Chicago and office of the Sheriff's Chief of Police. These interviews were
made during the month of November, 1951
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Control on a State Level: In order to obtain central responsibility and
coordination in the field of law enforcement, some states have assumed varying
degrees of direct or indirect supervision over municipal and county law en-
forcement officials. Such state control is not widely utilized today, but there
was a period several generations ago when direct state control was generally
accepted and applied to the police of the larger metropolitan cities of the
United States.4 1 At the present time there are three states which provide
for the direct appointment of county law enforcement officers ;42 in five other
states the principal police officials of the cities are appointed by the state.4 3
Justification for state intervention is based on the premise that the laws en-
forced by local police have their primary source in the state's police powers;
therefore, the state owes a direct duty to its citizens to provide adequate and
equal enforcement of its laws. In practice, state supervision of local police has
met with little success.44 A principal reason for the failure of the scheme lies
partly in the fact that the cities singled out for control have generally been of
a different political inclination than the state governments supervising them.4 5
This in turn has resulted in friction between the state appointed police officials
and the city governments. This same fault might well exist in the case of
Chicago,48 and such a system would solve few if any of the problems caused
by the multiplicity of law enforcement units operating within Cook County.
A number of states have provided a procedure through which the governor
of the state can remove county law enforcement officers for nonfeasance or
malfeasance in office. Provision for this authority has been made by twelve
states17 and has served as an effective instrument for improving the caliber
of county law enforcement.4 8 In Illinois the state's attorney and the sheriff
are county officials entrusted respectively with the duty of prosecuting and
enforcing state laws.40 In practice, no state officer in Illinois exercises any
coordinating supervision over either of the two officials and if they do not
wish to coordinate their activities there is no higher authority in the state
41. SMITH, THE BALTIMORE POLICE SURVEY, 4 (1941); FISHER AND BISHOP, MUNICIPAL
AND OTHER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, 327 (1950).
42. The County Sheriff in the State of Rhode Island is appointed by the Governor and
holds office at the Governor's pleasure. R. I. GEN. LAWS c. 5, §16 (1938). In Florida and
New Jersey the county prosecutor is appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent
of the state senate. FLA. CONSr. Art. V, §15, 27; N. J. CONST. Art. VII, §2, par. 3.
43. Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri and New Hampshire. In St. Louis and
Kansas City, Missouri, police boards are appointed by a state authority. In Boston,
Massachusetts and Baltimore, Maryland, a single administrative chief of police is des-
ignated by the governor of the state. SMITH, POLICE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES,
209 (1949).
44. SMITH. THE BALTIMORE POLICE SURVEY, 4 (1941).
45. SMITH, POLICE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES, 209 (1949).
46. The administration of the City of Chicago has for many years been controlled by
the Democratic party, but the Legislature and the office of Governor of the State of Illinois
quite often are controlled by the Republican party.
47. ARR. CONSr. Art. XV, §3; FLA. CONST. Art. IV, §15; KY. CONST. §227; KY. REV. STAT.
c. 63, §63.100-130 (1948); ME. CONST. Art. IX, §5; MICH. CONST. Art. IX, §7; MICH. STAT.
ANNO, c. 58, §6.696 (1936) ; MINN. STAT. C. 351, §351.03-.04 (1949) ; N. Y. CONsT. Art.
IX, §.6; N. D. REV. CODE c. 44, §1101 (1943); ORE. CONST. Art. VII, §20; PA. CONST. Art.
VI, §4; WASH. CONs?. Art. IV. §10; WIs. CONSr. Art VI, §4, WIs. STAT. c. 17, §17.09 (1949).
48. The power to remove local law enforcement officers has as a general rule been
used sparingly. Both Alfred E. Smith and Franklin D. Roosevelt, while Governor of the
State of New York, removed county sheriffs and district attorneys. In the past, county
law enforcement officers have been removed by Governors in the states of Wisconsin,
Minnesota, North Dakota, and Florida. Satterfield, State Appointment and Removal of
Law Enforcement Ofcers, 12 SOUTHWESTERN SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 6-8, 14-15 (1932).
49. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 14, §5 (1951). Duties of state's attorney. ILL. REV. STAT. C. 125,
§17 (1951'). Sheriff as conservator of the peace.
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requiring them to do so.50 Vesting in the Governor of Illinois the power to
remove for cause state's attorneys or sheriffs might aid in solving possible
problems created by corrupt county law enforcement officials. But the mere
possibility of removal for malfeasance or nonfeasance would not induce states'
attorneys and sheriffs who are antagonistic to each other to coordinate their
respective activities. In a large number of states, the Attorney General of
the state has been given the power and responsibility of coordinating the law
enforcement activities of county officers. In theory this type of arrangement
should produce coordinated law enforcement activities at both the county and
state levels. In practice, however, supervision by the Attorney General has
been limited to emergency situations and in some states limited by statute to
specified conditions or circumstances.5 1
The Commission on Organized Crime of the American Bar Association 52 has
given serious study to the problems created by a lack of coordination and those
due to duplication produced by the American system of decentralized law
enforcement. The Commission states that "the assumption of authority on the
part of the state over criminal law enforcement is one of the basic means of
improving efficiency in dealing with organized crime..." 5 3 and "local govern-
ment must be made accountable to the state, either directly or indirectly, for
the enforcement of state laws." '54 To obtain this objective, the Commission
has proposed that local prosecutors be appointed by the governor, and that
in each state a department of justice be organized, to which local prosecuting
attorneys should be held responsible.55 This department would have general
supervision of law enforcement throughout each state, and would be directed
by an official appointed by, and directly responsible to the governor of the
state. The Commission also advocates that the state department of justice
be given authority to establish appropriate standards, procedures and prac-
tices for the police forces of the cities and villages within a state.56 However,
they do not advocate changing the existing structure of local law enforcement.
Compliance by local police forces with the standards formulated by the state
department of justice would be induced by giving grants-in-aid to those agen-
cies which met the minimum standards in all respects.
Under the American Bar Association plan responsibility for local law
enforcement would be concentrated in the Governor of Illinois, thus placing
50. Stevenson, A Problem of Law Enforcement: The Alliance of Crime and Politics,
36 A.B. A. J. 996 (1950). Hearings, supra note 7, at 153. But see, ILL. REV. STAT. c 14,
§4 (1951).
51. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE PowERs, DUTIES, AND OPERATIONS OF THE
ATTORNEYS' GENERAL OFFICES, 8 (1951). In sixteen states, the Attorney General has the
responsibility of coordinating law enforcement activities within the state. The states in
which the Attorney General possesses this power are Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont. and Wyoming. In the States of Arizona,
Florida, Louisiana, Oregon and Wyoming, the power of the Attorney General to coordinate
law enforcement activities within a state is limited.
52. American Bar Association Commission on Organized Crime, Robert P. Patterson,
Chairman. The Commission was appointed September, 1950 to cooperate with the Senate
Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce.
53. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION
ON ORGANIZED CRIME, 34 (1951).
54. Id. at 33.
55. Id. at 29. The state department of justice is not a novel idea. For the history and
ramifications of the proposal, see Stark, Politics and the State Department of Justice, 30 3.
CRIM. L. 182 (1939); Hicks, Proposal for a Department of Justice, 14- OREG. L. REV. 428
(1935). Medalie, A4 State Department of Justice, 69 U. S. L. REv. 545 (1935).
56. Id. at 34.
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ultimate responsibility on one official, rather than the diverse responsibility
present today. A high degree of integration of the police forces in Cook
County could be obtained through the standardization of police methods and
procedures by the state. The state could increase the efficiency of the present
police forces by providing for (1) a single county-wide police training school,
(2) centralization of information and communication systems, (3) expansion
of scientific crime detection services, and (4) compulsory reporting of the
law enforcement activities of each police unit to a centralized authority for
dissemination among the ninety police forces. A further benefit to be obtained
from state grants-in-aid could be the enlargement and improvement of the
smaller police forces in Cook County. However, there are some factors inherent
in such a centralized police organization, as that proposed by the Commission,
which tend to make it undesirable. 5"
Local law enforcement may have state and nationwide effects, but funda-
mentally it involves problems that must be solved locally.58 From an organi-
zational viewpoint the root of the problem in a metropolitan area such as
Cook County is essentially the presence of many independent and disunited
police organizations within a relatively small area. Instead of effecting any
consolidation of the ninety police forces, the Bar Association Commission pro-
poses to establish a remote system of state control, superimposed on the present
archaic organization of Cook County law enforcement. The financial grants-
in-aid recommended would encourage the local communities to cling all the
more tightly to their independent police forces, since a police force would be
a source of revenue. This in itself would discourage the consolidation of local
police units. In effect this reform passes the possibilities of abuse on to a
higher level. The proposed state control with its legions of state appointed
prosecutors and extensive grants-in-aid program presents many possibilities
for patronage and pork-barrel politics.5 9
There are also present within such a centralized system of state police power
well-founded dangers to civil liberties which the American Bar Association
itself recognizes.60 In interviews with persons familiar with the organization
and functioning of the European centralized police systems, the point was
stressed that though the European state-controlled police were intensely
efficient, they were also extremely effective instrumnts for the destruction of
civil liberties.6 '
Limited aspects of state control and supervision are not subject to these
various objections. The state could establish and operate standardized police
schools for the training of local police or aid in the expansiqn of scientific
crime detection facilities without directly or indirectly controlling the local
police function. However, it is questionable whether such limited supervision
would materially aid in solving the problems created in metropolitan areas
due to decentralization of authority.
Consolidation of organizations and centralization of authority can be ac-
complished through a reorganization of law enforcement on the local level
57. The American Bar Association proposal, or similar plan, was not favored by any
of ten persons interviewed who are either familiar with, or directly connected *ith law
enforcement in Cook County.
58. Stevenson, supra note 50, at 994. But see, MacNamara, A4merican Police Wdministra-
tion at Mid Century, 10 PUBL. ADMEN. REV. 185 (1950).
59. Stark, supra note 55, at 182.
60. AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, op. cit. supra note 53, at 32.
61. The above was the opinion of Mr. Fred E. Inbau, Professor of Law, Northwestern
University School of Law, and Mr. Rex R. Andrews, Chief of Police of th Village of
Winnetka. Both men served in Germany as Public Safety Consultants in the United States
State Department Exchange of Persons Program.
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without resort to state control and the objections that accompany it. Partial
integration of law enforcement can be brought about at the present time in
Cook County through voluntary cooperation and a minimum of statutory
revision.
Voluntary Cooperation at the Local Level: In practice many of the police
forces in Cook County are now coordinating limited aspects of their police
work. The Chicago Police and the Park Police have established policies for
coordinating certain of their activities within the City of Chicago. 62 There is
also a high degree of coordination of police activity among certain of the
suburbs of Chicago. Sections 8-5 and 8-6 of the Illinois Cities and Villages
Act 63 directly encourage the integration of police forces within a county. This
statute, which enables the police of adjoining municipalities to preserve the
peace in either community, is being used in the suburbs north of Chicago.
There is close communication among the north shore cities and villages and in
emergencies the different police of this area answer each other's calls and pool
their men and facilities irrespective of boundary lines. 64
On the county level there are specific plans for coordination in certain emer-
gencies, such as jail breaks or the commitment of a major crime within the
county. One plan is a system of road blocks that can be thrown up on all
highways about the city of Chicago within a few minutes after the Sheriff
has given a radio signal asking for assistance. This plan involves the cooper-
ation of all suburban police and all have performed well when the occasion
demanded. 65
Another indication that the ninety police agencies of Cook County can col-
laborate in their efforts is illustrated by the Chicago Police Crime Detection
Laboratory. This Laboratory offers many facilities which the smaller police
forces of Cook County cannot afford to duplicate, and for this reason the entire
metropolitan region of Chicago must rely on its services and facilities. In
practice, the services of the Crime Laboratory have been provided to all police
forces and the result has been a centralization and coordination of scientific
crime detection. 6
Unfortunately, in the field of police training the situation is not so satisfac-
tory. The Chicago Police Department has a training system completely sepa-
rate from that of the Chicago Park Police. The Sheriff's police are trained as
62. On election days, the Chicago Park Police assign approximately six hundred men to
help guard the voting polls of Chicago. In cases of serious emergency, such as a fire in
the loop area, the Park Police make available their manpower and equipment. The Park
Police collect their traffic fines through the Chicago Municipal Courts and use the Chicago
jails. Prior to 1949, both the Chicago Police and the Park Police required a separate
report of vehicle accidents that occurred on boulevards or parkways within the jurisdiction
of the Chicago Park Police. The result was that often a distressed and confused motorist
was questioned twice by separate policemen as to the circumstances of an accident. This
obvious duplication has been corrected and now one report serves the files of both organi-
zations. The information in this footnote was obtained in interviews at the office of the
Chicago Police Commissioner on November 7, 1951, and at the headquarters of the Chicago
Park Police on November 14, 1951.
63. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 24 §8-5, §8-6 (1*951).
64. The information in the above paragraph was obtained in an interview with a police
chief of a North Shore village on November 16, 1951.
65. This information concerning coordination at the County level was obtained in an
interview at the office of the Sheriff's Chief of Police on November 30, 1951, and from an
interview at the Chicago Crime Commission on November 23, 1951.
66. Information relevant to the Chicago Police Crime Detection Laboratory was acquired
in the interview at the office of the Chicago Police Commissioner. It was the opinion of
all persons connected with law enforcement who were interviewed by the authors that the
Chicago Crime Laboratory was an example of excellent cooperation and coordination of
law enforcement in Cook County.
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an independent organization, and the rest of the police forces in the county are
left to look after their own trainng needs. In the opinion of one police chief in
Cook County, integration of police training activities could produce a great
improvement in the quality of law enforcement. In other states there have
been established systems of zone training schools for police, instigated in dif-
ferent cases by state governments, leagues of municipalities, or state associa-
tion of police chiefs.67 Such an experiment is long overdue in the Chicago
metropolitan area.
Recently an additional step was taken in the right direction when the Sheriff
and State's Attorney of Cook County agreed to have regular weekly meetings
in order to discuss their mutual problems. 68 This, in itself, is an improvement,
but should only be considered as a start toward closer coordination of all the
police organizations of the county. In a certain part of the County, local police
chiefs already are holding regular weekly meetings. The opinion is expressed
that these meetings have led to closer integration of police work in that area. 69
The State's Attorney and Sheriff have on occasion held county-wide meetings
of police chiefs to discuss particular problems, but these meetings have not
assumed a regular aspect. In the State of California, an attempt to secure
uniformity in law enforcement through voluntary meetings of sheriffs, prose-
cutors and local police chiefs is presently being made.70 Similar meetings led
by the Sheriff and State's Attorney of Cook County7 l would constitute a step
toward reorganizing the law enforcement structure of the county on a more
efficient basis. Such meetings could provide a forum in which solutions to some
of the law enforcement problems of Cook County could be presented and
discussed. Initial progress toward a centralized training program, information
service and communication system might be commenced. Some of the dupli-
cations of effort present in the control of highway traffic could be eliminated
by mutual agreements. Information from the ninety police forces as to the
movement of organized crime throughout the County could be correlated and
attempts made to secure consistency and uniformity of law enforcement on the
part of all police agencies.
Regular meetings of the ninety law enforcement agencies of Cook County,
however, is an expediency which is subject to the further limitation that there
is no authority to compel continued whole-hearted cooperation from those
not already inclined to give it. However, such meetings would tend to create
metropolitan consciousness in Cook County law enforcement which would
encourage movement toward the basic reform, which is the creation of a met-
ropolitan police system.
67. SMITH, POuICE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES, 298-9 (1949). "Los Angeles Police
Department has opened its excellent recruit training program to police officers of sur-
rounding communities." MacNamara, supra note 58, at 187.
68. See Chicago Daily News, Oct. 15, 1951, p. 1, col. 4; Oct. 17, 1951, p. 1, col. 8; Oct.
29, 1951, p. 3, col. 6; Nov. 15, p. 10, col. 3.
69. This opinion was expressed on November 16, 1951, by Mr. Rex R. Andrews, who as
Chief of Police of the Village of Winnetka has taken part in the regular weekly meetings
held by police chiefs of the Chicago North Shore suburban area.
70. PENAL CODE OF CALIF. Pt. 1, tit. 13, c 4, §480 (1949). See also, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, op. cit. supra note 53, at 33.
71'. One of the problems involved in regular county-wide law enforcement meetings
concerns who should conduct the meetings. The Sheriff is the chief law enforcement
officer of Cook County but in actual practice has little contact with many of the Police
Chiefs of the larger incorporated communities. The State's Attorney of Cook County is
not technically a county law enforcement officer. However, due to his position as county
prosecutor, he has close working relations with all the law enforcement agencies in Cook
County. A solution to this problem might be obtained through joint leadership by the Cook
County Sheriff and State's Attorney.
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Consolidation and Centralization on the Local Level: The concept of a
metropolitan police administration is not a new idea. Rather, it has been the
subject of a great deal of interest in metropolitan areas.7 2 A consolidation
of police forces in the metropolitan areas of Philadelphia, New York, New
Orleans and Boston was obtained in the mid Nineteenth Century by the incor-
poration of surrounding communities, culminating in complete incorporation
of the county by the city.7 3 It is stated that these consolidations had "a salu-
tary effect on the police systems of the enlarged areas as a whole. "74 However,
today where large incorporated suburbs exist as they do in Cook County, this
type of annexation with the consequent consolidation of governmental func-
tions has been found to be very difficult to accomplish. 75
An expedient method of obtaining a metropolitan police administration is
through the creation of a special metropolitan district. The creation of special
districts or authorities has been a favorite device for solving particular metro-
politan problems, and it is interesting to note that Illinois has led in the
creation of metropolitan districts. 7 6 Previous to city-county consolidation in
Philadelphia and New York City, the respective state legislatures found it
necessary to create special metropolitan police districts, since the suburban
police were incapable of handling the police problems of the rapidly developing
metropolitan areas. 77
In 1932, a detailed study of the Chicago and Cook County area was con-
ducted and a metropolitan police administration was proposed by the Illinois
Commission on Taxation and Expenditures.7 8 The Commission recommended
the establishment of a metropolitan police administration for a police district
coterminous with the boundaries of Cook County. The administration was to
be supported by taxes levied on the whole county, and directed by a single
director chosen by and responsible to some elected county governing board.
The metropolitan police administration was to be empowered to take over all
the functions of the police departments and forces of the various cities, villages
and park districts of Cook County. Any city or village could, however, au-
thorize the establishment of a supplementary police force so long as that
police force respected the authority of the metropolitan police director.7 9
This reform has never been adopted by the Illinois Legislature. Neverthe-
less, numerous persons connected with law enforcement in Cook County believe
that some form of metropolitan police system is the solution to the problems
created by ninety independent law enforcement agencies operating in the
County.
Cook County, under a metropolitan police system, would be policed
entirely by one law enforcement agency and direct responsibility would be
72. MacNamara, supra note 58, at 184.
73. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, THE GOVERNMENT OF METROPOLITAN AREAS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 126, 171 (1930).
74. Id. at 126.
75. TABLEMAN, GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION IN METROPOLITAN AREAS, 13-14 (1951). A
recent consolidation, that of Baton Rouge with East Baton Rouge Parish, was voted to the
amazement of political scientists in 1948. For a discussion of the consolidation, see Reed,
Progress in Metropolitan Integration, 9 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 1 (1949).
76. TABLEMAN, op. cit. supra note 75, at 6r (1951).
77. These apparently were the only two metropolitan police districts established in the
United States and they were eliminated in the later consolidations in Philadelphia and
New York City. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, op. cit. supra note 73, at 257-9.
78. Created by an Act of the Illinois General Assembly approved June 29, 1931.
79. THE ILLINOIS COMMISSION ON TAXATION AND EXPENTITURES, PROPOSALS FOR THE
REORGANIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ILLINOIS--THE CHIICAGO-COOK COUNTY METRO-
POLITAN AREA, 21 (1932).
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placed on one person. The establishment of one police force for the entire
county area would solve most of the present problems of duplication, incoordi-
nation and inadequacies. For example, duplication of efforts in traffic control
between the Chicago Park Police and the Chicago Police would disappear.
The same would hold true in traffic outside Chicago, since the work presently
performed by the state highway police, sheriff's police and local police would
be accomplished by one metropolitan police department. The sheriff would
cease to be a law enforcement officer and the metropolitan police would be the
primary law enforcement agency in Cook County.80 - This would eliminate
any frictions or duplications created today when the sheriff makes raids in
incorporated areas.
A centralized county communication system could be established which
would result in unity of action and free flow of information in every detail
of police work. A county-wide police training school and criminal laboratory
could also be created. Furthermore, the small police units in Cook County
would be consolidated with one over-all administration. A more mobile and
equal protection could be obtained from a metropolitan police system, since
the metropolitan police could operate anywhere in the county and not be sub-
ject to technical restraints created by municipal boundary lines.
The disadvantages present in state control of local law enforcement are not
present in a consolidation and centralization of authority on a local level.
There is no element of remote state control, nor does it seem that a metro-
politan police organization is as effective an instrument for the depravation
of democratic liberties.
There are several factors operating against the adoption of a metropolitan
police district at the present time. One is the fact that a major legislative.
program and a constitutional amendment would be necessary to create a
metropolitan police administration for Cook County.8 ' Moreover, any form
of metropolitan police is a definite step away from local autonomy, a concept
very much a part of the American system of local government. A partial con-
solidation of governmental functions may also have the undesirable effect of
setting up a metropolitan police district and the city of Chicago as two power-
ful and competitive governments in Cook County. Such a situation could
result in rivalry instead of cooperation in governmental operations. The
influence of the one large central core of government, Chicago, would be
deemphasized by the creation of a county-wide metropolitan police district.
The argument has been advanced that Chicago should instead be emphasized
as a rallying point for the creation of a politically unified metropolitan area.82
The difficulties involved in overcoming local autonomy and also securing the
major legislative and constitutional reform needed to set up a special district
80. In Illinois, to divest a sheriff of any of his common law functions, such as law
enforcement, would require a constitutional amendment. Dahnke v. People, 168 Ill. 102,
48 N.E. 137 (1897) ; People ex. rel. Walsh v. Board of Com'rs of Cook County, 397 Il1. 293,
74 N.E. 2d 503 (1947). People v. Clampitt, 362 Ill. 534, 200 N.E. 332 (1936), holds that "the
legislature may add to, but cannot take away from, the powers and duties of the sheriff."
81. To create a metropolitan police administration for the Chicago-Cook County area,
a constitutional amendment would be necessary to eliminate the law enforcement powers
of the Cook County Sheriff and the substitute law enforcement powers of the Cook County
Coroner. The police prerogatives of the cities and villages of Cook County would have
to be curtailed due to the fact that the local communities would be required to recognize
the metropolitan police as the principal police force of each community. Also, a great deal
of enabling legislation would be necessary so that the metropolitan police district and ad-
ministration could function as an independent unit of government.
82. MERRIAM, PARRETr AND LEPAwsKY, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE METROPOLITAN REGION
OF CHICAGO, 152 (1933).
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for a metropolitan police force may be too great to surmount at the present
time. Possibly the creation of a metropolitan police system can only be acheved
in the future through the slow territorial expansion of Chicago with eventual
city-county governmental consolidation. 83
The creation of a metropolitan police force, nevertheless, is the only perma-
nent solution to the organizational problems of law enforcement in Cook
County. Present efforts toward voluntary cooperation and coordination are
commendable, but no permanent solution to the problems inherent in the
structure of law enforcement can be obtained without a consolidation of con-
trol and responsibility. This consolidation should be obtained through a reor-
ganization of the law enforcement structure at the local level rather than
through a usurpation of local police power by the state.
Abstract of Recent Cases
State Constitutionally Brings Prosecution After Acquiring Jurisdiction
by Force-In Frisbie v. Collins, 72 S. Ct. 509 (1952), defendant, acting as
his own counsel, brought habeas corpus proceeding seeking release from
a Michigan state prison where he was serving a life sentence for murder.
He alleged that while he was living in Chicago, he was forcibly seized,
handcuffed, blackjacked and carried into Michigan. He claimed violations
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Federal
Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §1201 (1952). Mr. Justice Black, writing the
opinion for a unanimous court, held that forcible abduction from one state
to another in violation of the Federal Kidnapping Act would not invalidate
a subsequent conviction and sentence in the latter state on the ground of
denial of due process. The Court thus reaffirmed the rule announced in
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886), that the power of a court to
try a person for a crime is not impaired by the fact that the court acquired
jurisdiction by force.
Prior Conviction of Drunkenness Not Admissible to Refute Claim of Un-
avoidable Accident-In State v. Crawford, 105 N.E. 2d 443 (Ohio 1951), the
defendant appealed a conviction of unlawfully killing another person in an
automobile collision while operating a motor vehicle "without due regard for
safety." The defendant purchased the car the day before the accident, had
it completely checked, and had driven the car through city traffic with the
brakes operating effectively. He saw the other car at "an assured clear dis-
tance," applied the foot brakes and discovered he had no such brakes. The
collision followed. The lower court permitted the jury to consider a former
municipal court conviction of the defendant of a charge of drunkenness
for the purpose of refuting the claim of "unavoidable accident" on the
theory that the prior act may be material in considering the defendant's
absence of "mistake or accident." OHio GEN. CODE §13444-19 (1951). The
appellate court held this instruction to be prejudicial error.
Limitations on Impeachment of Witnesses-In a prior criminal case, wit-
nesses for the prosecution gave surprise testimony which was contrary to
written statements made previously. A mistrial was declared. Subsequently the
83. In 1899 there was a strong movement led by Judge Tuley for a constitutional
amendment to extend the boundaries of Chicago to the limits of Cook County, and thus
unite the two governments. This plan failed although it obtained 45 out of a total of 1'11
votes. Id. at 147.
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counsel retained by the witnesses was charged with having suborned these
witnesses to testify falsely. Culwell v. United States, 194 F.2d 808 (5th Cir.
1952). In Culwell's trial the government relied upon the same witnesses
who had previously given false statements. In the course of direct examina-
tion of one of these witnesses, the government's attorney accused the witness
of giving false testimony, then produced a written statement previously made
by the witness, and over strenuous and repeated objections of appellant's
counsel was permitted to read the lengthy statement before the jury with a
query to the witness at the end of each sentence as to whether her previous
statement was true or false. Held, that hearsay testimony over appellants'
objection was prejudicial error. The court pointed out: 1) that impeaching
testimony must be limited to the point of surprise; 2) it cannot be permitted
to go beyond the purpose of removing the damage caused thereby; and
3) the rules of evidence against hearsay and ex parte statements cannot be
disregarded.
Constitutionality of Gamblers' Occupational Tax Not Settled-The Federal
District Courts are arriving at various conclusions concerning the legality
of Section 471 of the Internal Revenue Act of 1951, 26 U.S.C.A. 3285 (1951),
depending upon the avenue of approach. In Combs v. Snyder, 101 F. Supp.
531 (D. C. 1951), the court denied an injunction to restrain the enforcement
of the 10 per cent excise tax on wagers on the theory that the plaintiff came
into court with "unclean hands." The court dismissed the constitutional
questions as "unnecessary to discuss."
The question of self-incrimination was considered and decided in the gov-
ernment's favor by the court in United States v. Forrester, 20 U.S.L. W =2
2415 (U.S. March 18, 1952). Here the court pointed out that the Fifth
Amendment is not violated when disclosure may lead to a state prosecution
only.
In United States v. Kahriger, 20 U.S.L. WEEK 2536 (U.S. May 13, 1952),
the court considered the statute as an invasion of the "sanctuary of state
control" under the guise of the taxing power. The court maintained the
position that the federal government may not impose penalties above and
beyond those specified by state law for infractions of a state's criminal code.
These decisions are not to be considered final but are interesting in terms
of the varying approaches taken by the District Courts.
Scope of Statute Making Highway Accident Reports Inadmissible as
Evidence-In Rockwood v. Pierce, 51 N.W. 2d 670 (Minn. 1952) the defend-
ant Pierce, a party to an automobile accident, made an admission against
his interest while giving evidence to a Highway patrolman for the purposes
of a police report. While in the hospital the day following the accident,
Pierce told the police he did not know just what happened. A Minnesota
statute (similar to the statutes in California, Illinois and Michigan) renders
all police accident reports inadmissible as evidence in civil or criminal cases.
Muvnc. STAT. §169.09 subd. 13 (1947). The Supreme Court of Minnesota
held that where statements are made to a highway patrolman relating to the
manner in which an automobile collision occurred, such statements are
not privileged but are admissible within the statute as "proof of the facts
to which the police report relates." The court cited like holdings in California,
Illinois and Michigan. Carpenter v. Gibson, 80 Cal. App. 2d 269, 181 P. 2d 953
(1947) ; Ritter v. Nieman, 329 Ill. App. 163, 67 N.E. 2d 417 (1946) ; Heiman
v. Kolle, 317 Mich. 548, 27 N.W. 2d 92 (1947).
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